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Joshua Weinstein’s new book makes a substantial contribution to our under-
standing of the Republic by paying close attention to early stages of the argu-
ment for the city-soul analogy in books II–IV. Weinstein argues persuasively
that these books are fundamentally political (correcting the tendency see the
real political theory of the Republic as starting in book V), and that the ele-
ments of tripartite psychology are systematically developed from the found-
ing of the city (rather than depending solely on arguments in book IV). His
reconstruction of the argument is judicious and careful, and focuses on the
text of the Republic.
The work is fittingly divided into three parts. Weinstein’s strategy is to
identify and motivate the arguments for the tripartite division of soul and
city, thus illuminating the nature of justice and its inner workings (7).
He details three arguments that establish Plato’s position: an argument
from a diversity of characters and lives, an argument from an opposition of
motivations, and an argument from the sufficiency of function of each of
the soul parts (7). Part 1 argues that Plato relies on a “recognized sociology”
(11) or “observational anthropology” (43), establishing three basic kinds of
character: wisdom loving, victory loving, and profit loving. While there are
different manifestations or orderings of these drives to curiosity, ambition,
and acquisition in different people, ultimately there are only three basic
drives or motivations (59). Thus, there are three (and only three) soul parts
because there are three distinctive drives and lives, even though there are
multifarious psychological effects from their interactions.
Part 2 moves to the development of the just city. Weinstein’s methodology is
to explain the function of the parts by considering self-sufficiency: “if the lack
of a certain part precludes the self-sufficiency of the political whole, then that
part can be said to have a function in the whole, and it can thus be said to ‘do
its own’ (or not) as it contributes justly to the good life of the whole” (106).
Using the city analogy advances Plato’s argument because the functions
required for a self-sufficient city are easier to identify, yet they also correspond
directly to the functions of the soul. Weinstein then departs from scholarly
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orthodoxy in explaining the “one person one job” principle not by reference to
the pragmatic efficiency of division of labor (which he insightfully critiques)
but by reference to the analytical argument from function: the jobs of the city
need to be clearly identifiable in the formal structure of the city for us to
understand each function (118).
Weinstein then explains the development of the city: first, basic bodily
needs must be accounted for, but the need to trade, sell, and distribute
goods leads the city to include merchants and move “from socialism to cap-
italism” (124). Though it satisfies basic needs, the early city has no awareness
that this is its purpose and thus no internal limit on what it produces (132).
In order to appease the senses and generate pleasure, the city begins to
produce luxuries, but the unrestrained pursuit of luxuries leads to war
(147): increasing demand for luxuries increases population growth and puts
pressure on limited land, but without a correlate increase of food supplies
the city eventually begins to starve (152–57). The solution is to invade neigh-
boring territories for farmland––and this requires an army. The argument
from function then requires a class of specialist soldiers. But without guidance
of whom to fight and when to fight, the soldiers cannot perform their function
well. Thus the need for the soldiers to be led prompts the inclusion of philos-
ophers (161). In each case, the higher classes of the city correct the deficiencies
of the lower and collectively form a self-sufficient whole.
Part 3 returns to concerns about the function of the spirited part of the soul
and about its necessity. Weinstein’s key claim is that “no amount of reason is
sufficient, on its own, to make up for the failings of the appetites” (204).
Because the appetites’ drive to luxury and excess cannot be “argued away”
and the appetites are prone to usurp reason through rationalization, there
must be a soul part whose job it is to use force to hold oneself to one’s rea-
soned commitments. Weinstein thus argues that spirit’s love of victory is man-
ifest in a desire to succeed in achieving one’s ends (242). While some
commentators understand the spirited part of the soul as seeking positional
or social goods, Weinstein focuses on the description of spirit as the preserver.
Because the success of our projects involves overcoming pleasure or pain,
spirit has a necessary function to play in successful agency by preserving
our goals and plans. This framework allows Weinstein to segue into a discus-
sion of the time valence of spirit, which focuses on mid-term goals in the face
of short-term temptations. The account of characteristic temporalities of each
soul part is the most speculative part of the book, but the view deserves
careful reflection and its mechanics become clearer as the book progresses
(esp. 261).
On the whole, Weinstein’s arguments are compelling and rely on reason-
able interpretations of the text. There are, however, moments where the
framing of particular issues is puzzling. Readers may be surprised when
Weinstein attributes different characters and ways of life to soul parts (92).
Commentators normally understand character as what emerges from one’s
soul taken as a whole, even though one’s particular beliefs, desires, and














































impulses might conflict. Weinstein thus departs from a common view about
each soul part having characteristic powers and desires, and those desires
shaping one’s life if they dominate in the soul. Rather, he claims that “Plato
sees every individual as living, at certain times and under some circum-
stances, each of the three lives” (55). Weinstein attempts to clarify this
paradox by describing character as a “fractal in time” (56)––but layered met-
aphors becomemurky here, and one might worry that Weinstein has used the
explanandum (different characters) to motivate the proposed explanans (differ-
ent soul parts).
More constructively, Weinstein might profitably develop his views by
engaging with the literature on imperfect or nonphilosophical virtue to
explore ways in which appetitive and thumotic forces can be controlled
without the perfection of one’s own reason. Though the “highest expression”
of reason is found in one’s own knowledge of the Forms (198), Weinstein’s
account leaves open the possibility that other kinds of guidance from
reason might result in political good functioning (for example, through law
or the direction of wise rulers). While Weinstein has shown how appetite
and spirit cannot be left to their own devices without nefarious consequences,
Plato suggests that there are a number of ways in which to create order in the
city and the soul without everybody becoming a philosopher.
In sum, Weinstein’s book is primarily about the moral psychology of the
Republic—and it is an excellent and insightful book for scholars interested
in this aspect of Plato’s thought. Moreover, it is essential reading for scholars
working on any aspect of Republic II–IV. Some readers of this journal may find
the long discussions of psychology slow going for the political upshots
garnered, but for Weinstein’s more general audience in ancient philosophy
and for those whose teaching and research focuses closely on the city-soul
analogy in the Republic, this book will surely be rewarding.
–Jeremy Reid Q1
University of Maryland,
College Park
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